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Seneca’s philosophical writings concern a virtue, among others also the virtues of justice, temperance (or 
moderation), fortitude and prudence. They are four virtues from the time of St. Ambrose called cardinal. 
Seneca gives this definition of the virtue temperantia: “cupiditates refrenare” – to confine one’s desires. 
So the temperance is practising self-control, abstention and moderation. Seneca discuses it very often in a 
wider context of the different virtues, with which it’s tightly connected according to a stoical idea of the 
inseparability of the virtues. He claims that we have to learn virtue. Seneca reminds that life is not easy and 
only the indications of the philosophy concerning virtue preserve from the unjust fortune.
keywords: philosophy; Stoicism; virtue; temperance (moderation); desires; Seneca the Younger.
The theory of active virtue accessible for every human regardless of their 
origin, social status, level of education, testified to a great power of stoicism in 
the history of mankind.1 Lucius Annaeus Seneca as a Roman representative of 
the late Stoa taught how to live in accordance with the nature, that is virtuous, 
and thus happy life.
Happiness back then was perceived as greatly uncertain, as the beginning of the 
new era (i.e. the times of Seneca’s life) brought Rome an epoch entailing a difficult 
systemic transformation. The Stoics demonstrated a way of becoming independent 
of any external factors by solely striving for the internal goods dependent of the 
man only, that is the virtue. A strong combination of wisdom, virtue, independence 
and happiness was critical for the Greek ethics after Socrates, but no-one was 
more concerned about it or deepen it so much as the Stoics did. They considered 
virtue as a sufficient condition of happiness, and even identified it with happiness, 
and deemed it the highest good or the only true good.2
The science of virtues was one of Seneca’s most important philosophical 
considerations. Moreover, it had a considerable impact on the philosophy and 
1 Cf. krokiewicz 1978, 240–241.
2 Cf. Tatarkiewicz 2005, 148.
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theology of subsequent centuries. The virtue of temperantia is considered as one 
of the four cardinal virtues whose theory is rooted in Plato’s writings, particularly 
the Republic. This blueprint of basic virtues became more significant in late 
Antiquity, mainly in the Christian tradition, where since the time of St. Ambrose 
of Milan (4th century) the teachings of the four virtues, from then on called 
cardinal ones, developed.
Seneca sees in philosophy studium virtutis,3 calling it also vitae lex.4 The only 
goal he sets for it is learning the truth about divine and human things (“huius opus 
unum est de divinis humanisque verum invenire”).5 The generally perceived virtue 
has many variations that can be identified in keeping with various circumstances 
life and various activities of the man: “Ceterum multae eius species sunt, quae 
pro vitae varietate et pro actionibus explicantur.”6 Nevertheless, all the virtues 
merge and create an entirety, like a retinue (comitatus virtutum consertarum et 
inter se cohaerentium”).7 They are different names, as it were, of one virtuous 
man; they are all advantages of the same spirit (“unius animi bona sunt”).8 
Individual virtues are equal (“Ratio rationi par est, sicut rectum recto; ergo et 
virtus virtuti; nihil enim aliud est virtus quam recta ratio”).9as they are all based 
in the one and the same virtuousness which provides the soul with righteousness 
and invariability: “omnibus enim istis una virtus subest, quae animum rectum et 
indeclinabilem praestat.”10
This principle also refers to the basic virtues, therefore iustitia, temperantia, 
prudentia, fortitudo appear in Seneca’s philosophical writings mainly in a 
broader context, namely they often appear among other virtues. However, the 
Roman philosopher perceives the prominence of these four virtues, which can be 
testified to by a fragment in which Seneca, in drawing the picture of a virtuous 
man, explains, full of delight, that if we could look at the spirit of the virtuous 
man, we would see a very beautiful view, venerable and resplendent with clement 
brilliance, a view on the one side illuminated by justice, and on the other side by 
fortitude, and still on the third side by temperance, and finally prudence.
Si nobis animum boni viri liceret inspicere, o quam pulchram faciem, quam sanctam, quam ex 
magnifico placidoque fulgentem videremus, hinc iustitia, illinc fortitudine, hinc temperantia 
prudentiaque lucentibus!11
 3 Cf. ep. 89, 8.
 4 Cf. ep. 94, 39.
 5 ep. 90, 3.
 6 ep. 66, 7.
 7 Cf. ep. 90, 3.
 8 Ben. IV 8, 3.
 9 ep. 66, 32.
10 ep. 66, 13.
11 ep. 115, 3.
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These four most important virtues are joined in this spiritual picture of the 
man by others that add to the man beauty, significance and seriousness combined 
with the charm of dignity.12 However, in this enumeration Seneca observes a 
certain sequence giving priority to the cardinal virtues.13
Passing on to the virtue of temperance, i.e. the notion temperantia, it’s worth 
noticing that in his philosophical writings (naturally, the extant ones) Seneca 
mentioned this virtue eighteen times, the fewest number in comparison with 
the cardinal virtues. Furthermore, in the texts included in the Milan manuscript 
as dialogues, the notion temperantia was only used in the dialogue de vita 
beata: twice in chapter ten and once in chapters twenty two and twenty five. In 
addition, Seneca mentioned this virtue once in the fourth book of de beneficiis 
together with other cardinal virtues. It also appears twice in de clementia. The 
most times, i.e. eleven, temperantia was mentioned in epistulae morales – in 
nine letters, and thrice in letter 113.14 
First, it’s worth mentioning how the philosopher specified this virtue in his 
letter, in which he briefly defined four cardinal virtues. According to Seneca, 
temperantia consists in cupiditates refrenare,15 meaning restraining lust and 
desire. The verb refrenare calls up a legitimate association with the bit, frenum, 
from which it derives. It means to restrain with the bit, tame, and metaphorically 
also to conquer, whip into line, restrict.16 Cupiditates is also semantically related 
to the term voluptates, which appears in one of Seneca’s letters with reference 
to temperance:
Temperantia voluptatibus imperat, alias odit atque abigit, alias dispensat et ad sanum modum 
redigit nec umquam ad illas propter ipsas venit; scit optimum esse modum cupitorum non 
quantum velis, sed quantum debeas sumere.17
Thus, the virtue of temperance is a power of giving orders to pleasures, to 
hate and chase away ones, and put in order others bringing them down to a 
12 ep. 115, 3: “Praeter has frugalitas et continentia et tolerantia et liberalitas comitasque et (quis 
credat?) in homine rarum humanitas bonum splendorem illi suum adfunderent. Tunc providentia 
cum elegantia et ex istis magnanimitas eminentissima quantum, di boni, decoris illi, quantum 
ponderis gravitatisque adderent! quanta esset cum gratia auctoritas! Nemo illam amabilem qui non 
simul venerabilem diceret”; also, see Trillitzch 1962, 112.
13 Their exceptional significance can be testified to by Seneca’s dialogue de officiis, which 
was devoted to these virtues. However, it has not survived until the present time. To some extent, 
the content of dialogue de officiis can be introduced to us by an extensive extract from it made 
in the 6th century by bishop VI Martin of Braga (Bracara), and dedicated to king Miro – Formula 
vitae honestae (principles of virtuous life).
14 Statistical data after: delatte, Evrard, Govaerts, denooz 1981, 785.
15 Cf. ep. 120, 11: “oportebat cupiditates refrenari.”
16 Cf. Plezia 1974, 488.
17 ep. 88, 29.
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proper measure, never according to what the man wants, but what they should. 
Comte-Sponville concludes:
Temperance is not matter of refusing to enjoy ourselves or enjpying ourselves as little as po-
ssible. That would not be virtue but sadness, not moderation but impotence, not temperance 
but ascetism.18
wyszomirski argues that in demonstrating in this fragment the role of 
temperance which it plays in removing lust, Seneca is in concord with the Stoic 
doctrine, and refers to the golden mean (›xij proairetik¾ ™n mesÒthti19), which 
principle was compared by Aristotle to the virtue of temperance, wanting to say 
that compared to desire this virtue takes a middle place so that the man could not 
become voluptuous, but also it does not recommend the man to preserve excessive 
restraint.20 As regards Seneca’s views on the task that temperantia should serve 
towards lust, they are closest to the teachings of Aristo of Chios who ascribed 
the function of restraining of lust ¹ ¢ret¾ ™piqum…an de. kosmoàsa kai. tÕ 
mštrion kai. to. eu;kairon ™n ¹dona‹j Ðr…zousa kšklhtai swfrosÚnh to 
the virtue of swfrosÚnh.21
Thus, temperance is rightly associated with measure. Latin noun modus is 
also linked with verb moderari or adjective modestus, so no wonder that Cicero 
struggling with devising Latin philosophical terminology wrote about moderatio 
or modestia (he hesitated about the name frugalitas): “soleo equidem tum 
temperantiam, tum moderationem appellare, non numquam etiam modestiam; 
sed haud scio an recte ea virtus frugalitas appellari possit.”22 No doubt, in 
moderatio he saw one of the more cardinal virtues:
Nam cum omnis honestas manet a partibus quattuor, quarum una sit cognitionis, altera com-
munitatis, tertia magnanimitatis, quarta moderationis, haec in deligendo officio saepe inter se 
comparentur necesse est.23
The term moderatio and the like were also used by Seneca in his writings, 
which can be evidenced by a fragment from dialogue de beneficiis: “quae est 
enim alienam rem non accipare moderatio”?,24 or other dialogues, like de ira:
‚Ita’inquit‚utilis adfectus est, si modicus est.’Immo si natura utilis est. Sed si inpatiens imperii 
rationisque est, hoc dum taxat moderatione consequetur, ut quo minor fuerit minus noceat; 
18 Comte-Sponville 2000, 38.
19 Arist, eN. 1106 b, 36.
20 Compare wyszomirski 1993, 87; also, see Arist, eN. 1107 b, 4–6.
21 stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta collegit Ioannes ab Arnim, vol. III 262 Stuttgardiae 1964 I 
375.
22 Cic. Tusc. III 16.
23 Cic. Off. I 152.
24 Ben. II 21, 4.
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ergo modicus adfectus nihil aliud quam malum modicum est,25 de tranquillitate animi: Sed, ut 
libertatis, ita vini salubris moderatio est,26 or letters: ingentis irae exitus furor est, et ideo ira 
vitanda est non moderationis causa sed sanitatis,27 moderatio vocatur ignavia,28 (on the soul of 
Scipio the African) Animum quidem eius in caelum ex quo erat redisse persuadeo mihi, non 
quia magnos exercitus duxit (…), sed ob egregiam moderationem pietatemque.29
Seemingly, the term moderatio is in Seneca equal to temperantia, as 
moderatio also has the task of restraining and calling to certain measure: 
non moderatio refrenat ac revocat?30 Śnieżewski thinks just this, and gives 
other synonyms for the cardinal virtue of temperance: modestia, continentia, 
clementia, constantia. In the case of Seneca, however, it seems that temperantia 
is not identical with moderatio. This can be demonstrated by a fragment of 
one of the letters in which the philosopher, having discussed the virtue of 
temperantia (and still earlier fortitudo),31 explaining that liberal sciences 
teach the virtues, but he (philosophy) enumerates examples of virtues, among 
which there appears no name of any cardinal virtue. Moreover, the three terms 
(modestia, moderatio, frugalitas), over which Cicero in the above fragment) 
pondered as Latin terms-equivalents for Greek swfrosÚnh, here (in Seneca) 
are mentioned as separate virtues: “non magis quam simplicitatem, quam 
modestiam ac moderationem, non magis quam frugalitatem ac parsimoniam, 
non magis quam clementiam.”32 Therefore, it seems legitimate to adopt the 
name temperantia only to define one of the cardinal virtues, and this is assumed 
for the sake of this exposition. 
It must be noticed that to this virtue, like to the virtue of justice or other 
virtues, refer certain general philosophical arrangements. Therefore, temperantia 
appears (as many as three times33) beside other virtutes in Seneca’s considerations 
devoted to whether virtue is a living being. As other virtues, also temperantia 
is a real adornment of human soul as opposed to external decorations.34 It is 
not an inborn gift either: one must become virtuous, and constantly exercise 
perfection.35 Stoic virtue is the highest good, therefore its prize is in itself, so the 
virtues (including temperance) must be desired for themselves, and not for any 
material benefit.36 
25 ira I 10, 4.
26 Tr. 17, 9.
27 ep.18, 15.
28 ep. 45, 7.
29 ep. 86, 1.
30 ep. 106, 9.
31 Cf. ep. 88, 29.
32 ep. 88, 30.
33 Temperantia in these consideratons from ep. 113 is mentioned in: 12, 15; 14, 11. 27.
34 Cf. ep. 115, 3.
35 Cf. e.g. ep. 90, 46.
36 Cf. e.g. Ben. IV 12, 4.
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It’s worth reminding that in dialogue de vita beata Seneca in referring 
to Socrates (“Hoc tibi ille Socrates dicet”37) introduces a division of virtues. 
Reminding that virtues are not acquired without effort, he divides the virtues into 
those that need a spur and those that need a bit: “Non est enim quod existimes 
ullam esse sine labore virtutem, sed quaedam virtutes stimulis, quaedam frenis 
egent.”38 Metaphorically, he explains that just as a man descending a steep slope 
must be restrained, and one climbing a steep mountain must be pushed, likewise, 
some virtues are on a steep hillside, and some go up. “Quemadmodum corpus 
in proclivi retineri debet, adversus ardua inpelli, ita quaedam virtutes in proclivi 
sunt, quaedam clivum subeunt.”39 To the former (ascending, exerting themselves 
and struggling ones) belong those virtues which are exposed to hardships, and 
conquer the fate, like patience, fortitude and perseverance: “An dubium est 
quin escendat nitatur obluctetur patientia fortitudo perseverantia et quaecumque 
alia duris opposita virtus est et fortunam subigit?”40. Temperance (including 
generosity and graciousness), in turn, undoubtedly goes down the steep hillside: 
“non aeque manifestum est per devexum ire liberalitatem temperantiam 
mansuetudinem?”41 So, temperantia and similar virtues restrain the spirit not to 
fall down as opposed to the first-group virtues which encourage it and extremely 
keenly animate it: “In his continemus animum ne prolabatur, in illis exhortamur 
incitamusque acerrime.”42 In subsequent statement: “Cum hoc ita divisum sit, 
malo has in usu mihi esse quae exercendae tranquillius sunt quam eas quarum 
experimentum sanguis et sudor est,”43 echoes the philosopher’s will to use more 
tranquil virtues in exercise (such as temperantia) rather than those which are 
associated with sweat and blood from the outset.
Coming back to the definition of temperantia, it’s worth noticing that the 
Roman philosopher recommends temperance not only with reference to lust or 
pleasures, but also in human relations, particularly when it comes to punishing 
somebody. Precisely such a situation is described by Seneca in de clementia (this 
text is a peculiar handbook of wisdom for the young ruler, Nero, Seneca’s student; 
in this writing the author mentioned temperantia twice, and each of these two 
fragments brings, as it were, a definition of this virtus), in book two, where he 
refers clemency (the title clementia) to this virtue. Concerned that clementia could 
be wrongly understood, and its pretence could lead to the opposite44 of this virtue, 
37 VB 25, 4.
38 VB 25, 5.
39 VB 25, 6.
40 VB 25, 6.
41 VB 25, 7.
42 VB 25, 7.
43 VB 25, 8.
44 It’s opposite is not severity (as it’s also a virtue, and virtues are oppose one another), but 
cruelty, i.e. ferocity in inflicting punishments: “Huic contrariam imperiti putant severitatem; sed 
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he wants to consider what it is like and what are its limits: “Et ne forte decipiat nos 
speciosum clementiae nomen aliquando et in contrarium abducat, videamus, quid 
sit clementia qualisque sit et quos fines habeat.”45 First, he defines clemency by 
making reference to temperance of the soul – in the punishing power and punishing 
out of revenge: “Clementia est temperantia animi in potestate ulciscendi.”46 
The first definition is broadened by the philosopher by two subsequent ones to 
avoid a dangerous situation where one definition would not exhaust the subject 
matter, and the subject matter itself would be affected by an error in the formula 
(“Plura proponere tutius est, ne una finitio parum rem comprehendat et, ut ita 
dicam, formula excidat”47). So, he defines clemency also as graciousness of a 
social superior towards a social inferior showed in punishment (“lenitas superioris 
adversus inferiorem in constituendis penis”), and as the soul’s disposition to 
lenience in punishing (“inclinatio animi ad lenitatem in poena exigenda”48).
On these three terms Seneca in the treatise de clementia does not complete 
his definition of clemency, as he also puts forth a definition closest to the truth 
(in his opinion) of this virtue as moderation that somehow restraints punishment, 
although it may be rightly inflicted, however, the philosopher points out that 
such formulation may meet the utmost opposition, because no virtue does less 
that anybody deserves: “Illa finitio contradictiones inveniet, quamvis maxime ad 
verum accedat, si dixerimus clementiam esse moderationem aliquid ex merita ac 
debita poena remittentem: reclamabitur nullam virtutem cuiquam minus debito 
facere.”49 To this problem Seneca answers that clemency, as it is commonly 
understood, consists precisely in alleviating of what can be justly adjudicated: 
“Atqui hoc omnes intellegunt clementiam esse, quae se flectit citra id, quod 
merito constitui posset.”50 It’s worth adding that also in one of his letters the 
philosopher speaks similarly and quite vividly on clementia as a virtue that 
saves somebody else’s blood as one’s own, and knows that the man should 
not prodigally abuse other people: “alieno sanguini tamquam suo parcit et scit 
homini non esse homine prodige utendum.”51
nulla virtus virtuti contraria est. Quid ergo opponitur clementiae? Crudelitas, quae nihil aliud est 
quam atrocitas animi in exigendis poenis” (Cl. II 4, 1). On the other hand, people often confuse 
clemency with pity which is not a virtue, but a disease of the soul: “Ad rem pertinet quaerere hoc 
loco, quid sit misericordia; plerique enim ut virtutem eam laudant et bonum hominem vocant 
misericordem. Et haec vitium animi est. Utraque circa severitatem circaque clementiam posita 
sunt, quae vitare debemus; per speciem enim severitatis in crudelitatem incidimus, per speciem 
clementiae in misericordiam” (Cl. II 4, 4)
45 Cl. II 3, 1.
46 Cl. II 3, 1.
47 Cl. II 3, 1.
48 Cl. II 3, 1.
49 Cl. II 3, 2.
50 Cl. II 3, 2..
51 ep. 88, 30.
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Coming back to de clementia, it’s worth looking at another fragment of 
book one. Also here, temperantia is combined with the virtue of clemency. 
First, Seneca reminds young Nero the history of his ancestor, cesar Augustus, 
presenting him as a clement ruler (although since he began ruling independently), 
as during the republic he had been famous for his severity in battle): “Hoc quam 
verum sit, admonere te exemplo domestico volo. divus Augustus fuit mitis 
princeps, si quis illum a principatu suo aestimare incipiat; in communi quidem 
rei publicae gladium movit.”52 Long singling out and presentation of the actions 
of the first Roman princeps is crowned by Seneca with a praise for Augustus 
whose deification he recognises with no compulsion, and whom he considers 
as a good ruler fully deserving to be called the homeland’s father for the sole 
reason of having been clement, which is expressed by Seneca in four examples. 
Namely, he writes that Augustus never took any cruel revenge whatsoever for 
insulting him (which vices usually hurt rulers more than breaking the law), but 
he condoned insults with a smile. Apart from that, it was visible that he himself 
was suffering the punishments that he inflicted on other. And finally, those 
whom he convicted for adultery with his daughter he not only spared, but also 
gave recommendation letters to those banished for their greater safety. 
deum esse non tamquam iussi credimus; bonum fuisse principem Augustum, bene illi parentis 
nomen convenisse fatemur ob nullam aliam causam, quam quod contumelias quoque suas, 
quae acerbiores principibus solent esse quam iniuriae, nulla crudelitate exsequebatur, quod 
probrosis in se dictis adrisit, quod dare illum poenas apparebat, cum exigeret, quod, quoscu-
mque ob adulterium filiae suae damnaverat, adeo non occidit, ut dimissis, quo tutiores essent, 
diplomata daret.53
The philosopher specifies with rapture as a real act of forgiveness, as the 
ruler not only spares the lives of the offenders, but also provides them with 
protection knowing that there will be many willing to help him out in anger by 
shedding the blood of others: “Hoc est ignoscere, cum scias multos futuros, qui 
pro te irascantur et tibi sanguine alieno gratificentur, non dare tantum salutem, 
sed praestare.”54 However, after all these praise there recurs the statement that 
such a ruler Augustus was only in his old age, or approaching it, but in his youth 
had been angry and did many things he averted his gaze from (literally: eyes) 
with aversion: “Haec Augustus senex aut iam in senectutem annis vergentibus; 
in adulescentia caluit, arsit ira, multa fecit, ad quae invitus oculos retorquebat.”55
Further on, Seneca makes outright reference to young Nero whom he does 
not want to compare to Augustus even in the latter’s great age (he argues that 
52 Cl. I 9, 1.
53 Cl. I 10, 3.
54 Cl. I 10, 4.
55 Cl. I II, 1.
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no-one would dare do that) for clemency. Although he confirms that the former 
with time became marked with restraint – Seneca uses here the term moderatus 
– and clemency, but only after many bloody war actions of which we reminds 
three. Namely, he invokes the sea Battle of Actium, in which Augustus defeated 
Antony and Cleopatra in 31 B.C., then the war with Sextus Pompeius (son of 
Pompey the Great) who after initial victories was finally defeated by him in 
Naulochos bay near the coast of Sicily in 36 B.C. on following six years of ever 
more fierce sea combat,56 and finally the war with Lucius Antonius, brother of 
triumvir Antony, when, after conquering and burning Perusia in Etruria in 40 
B.C., on the Ides of March he made bloody offering of several hundreds of his 
opponents taken captive despite their requesting and begging for acquittal or 
pardon.57 Moreover, Augustus made a proscription:
Comparare nemo mansuetudini tuae audebit divum Augustum, etiam si in certamen iuveni-
lium annorum deduxerit senectutem plus quam maturam; fuerit moderatus et clemens, nempe 
post mare Actiacum Romano cruore infectum, nempe post fractas in Sicilia classes et suas et 
alienas, nempe post Perusinas aras et proscriptiones.58
Thus, in Seneca’s opinion this ruler was not actually clement (and, as it 
results from the context of the discussed fragment, he wasn’t moderate either). 
The philosopher harshly expresses his view that he will not call tired cruelty 
clemency: “Ego vero clementiam non voco lassam crudelitatem.”59 
An opposite example (this time totally positive) of the virtues of clemency 
and temperance is young Nero. Seneca extols him by writing that his clemency 
is real, because it does not result from his repentance for his sins, it has no 
flaws and is not soaked with citizen blood: “haec est, Caesar, clementia vera, 
quam tu praestas, quae non saevitiae paenitentia coepit, nullam habere maculam, 
numquam civilem sanguinem fudisse.”60 Further on, Seneca will revert to 
praising Nero as the ruler who saved the state from bloodshed, did not shed a 
single drop of human blood in the entire world, which must be admired all the 
more so as no-one had previously received the sword of power at such a young 
age: “Praestitisti, Caesar, civitatem incruentam, et hoc, quod magno animo 
56 This battle is considered as the greatest and the most crucial sea combat ever fought in the 
ancient times on western waters – compare Cary, Scullard 1992, 573.
57 The events in Perusia were so described by Suetonius: “Perusia capta in plurimos 
animadvertit, orare veniam vel excusare se conantibus una voce occurrens, moriendum esse. 
Scribunt quidam, trecentos ex dediticiis electos, utriusque ordinis ad aram divo Iulio extructam 
Idibus Martiis hostiarum more mactatos” (Aug. 15). In fact, Octavian greatly undermined his 
reputation then by sending to death the entire innocent city council of Perusia; Cf., e.g. Cary, 
Scullard 1992, 570.
58 Cl. I II, 1.
59 Cl. I II, 2.
60 Cl. I II, 2.
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gloriatus es nullam te toto orbe stillam cruoris humani misisse, eo maius est 
mirabiliusque, quod nulli umquam citius gladius commissus est.”61
Here it’s worth reminding that Nero is only seventeen back then:
“all his predecessors were older by the time they received the emperor’s purple, even Caligu-
la, (the youngest of them) was already 25. Thus, it was also his boyhood which made people 
like him and pin their hopes on him. People believed that the young emperor would introduce 
some joyfulness, fun and new ideas into his court and the whole city. Everybody knew (…) 
that Nero had received a very good education, directed by Seneca himself; that he adored 
everything, that was Greek; that he shared the interest in music and theatre that was normal 
for youngsters.“62 
Unfortunately, it must not be forgotten that shortly it was to turn out that 
Nero, like his predecessors, would stand in contradiction to the assumptions of 
the Stoic doctrine of the ruler. All those emperors were “quite the opposite of 
that ideal, although, at the moment of the investiture, the senate was likely to 
regard each of them as the incarnation of this Stoic doctrine of the ruler. while 
that balloon of illusions was being burst, some conflicts started and the emperors 
reacted in reprisals (…). That is why this period is known as a period of storm, 
dramatic tension and dramatic deaths.”63
After the praise of Nero’s clementia vera, Seneca passes on immediately to 
temperantia. He gives a proper definition of this virtue in the person exercising 
supreme authority in the state. Namely, in the positive sense the ruler’s 
temperance is the most genuine when it means loving the human race as one’s 
own, and consequently, being moderate in a negative sense means for the ruler 
not to be guided by lust, recklessness, and not to imitate bad models left by 
previous rulers, trying to follow their example to examine to what extent one can 
be cruel to their citizens instead of blunting the blade of their power:
haec est in maxima potestate verissima animi temperantia et humani generis comprendens ut 
sui amor non cupiditate aliqua, non temeritate ingenii, non priorum principum exemplis cor-
ruptum, quantum sibi cives suos liceat, experiendo temptare, sed hebetare aciem imperii sui.64
It’s worth noticing that in the case of a good and clement ruler, his subjects 
should bear the bit he restricts them with as long as he lives and rules. Otherwise 
(when they strip it or won’t allow to impose it onto them again), their state will 
break up into many pieces. Seneca means a specific state, namely Roman one, 
and the system that prevails there:
61 Cl. I II, 3.
62 krawczuk 1986, 67–68 (trans. by the ed.).
63 Strzelecki 1965, 405. (trans. by the ed.)
64 Cl. I 11, 2.
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Hic casus Romanae pacis exitium erit, hic tanti fortunam populi in ruinas aget; tam diu ab isto 
periculo aberit hic populus, quam diu sciet ferre frenos, quos si quando abruperit vel aliquo 
casu discussos reponi sibi passus non erit, haec unitas et hic maximi imperii contextus in par-
tes multas dissiliet, idemque huic urbi finis dominandi erit, qui parendi fuerit.65
So temperantia of a clement ruler, respected by the citizens, ensures the state 
sustainability and unity. Therefore, Seneca sees this virtue in the ruler as strictly 
intertwined with clementia. This insight mainly results from the three above 
discussed fragments of his work de clementia.
Seneca writes about temperantia in yet other contexts. One of the most 
interesting (and somewhat contrasting with the message included in de 
clementia) is appearing of this virtue among the incentives to withdraw from 
any matters related to politics. In one of his letters, he begins this exposition with 
discussing people’s relationship to their bodies, and states that they love it and 
try to protect it. Seneca himself agrees that caring for the body is right, the only 
thing that’s wrong is serving it, because those who serve their bodies, who worry 
too much about them, and who relate everything to them, are at the service of 
many things. However, it is necessary for the man not to live for the body, but 
the way they couldn’t live without the body. Otherwise, excessive love for one’s 
body brings unrest and fears, and even insults, and, in addition, such a man finds 
no value in the virtue:
Fateor insitam esse nobis corporis nostri caritatem; fateor nos huius gerere tutelam. Non nego 
indulgendum illi, serviendum nego; multis enim serviet qui corpori servit, qui pro illo nimium 
timet, qui ad illud omnia refert. Sic gerere nos debemus, non tamquam propter corpus vivere 
debeamus, sed tamquam non possimus sine corpore; huius nos nimius amor timoribus inqu-
ietat, sollicitudinibus onerat, contumeliis obicit; honestum ei vile est cui corpus nimis carum 
est.66
The philosopher emphasises that the body is not the highest value, and 
although it must be attentively cared for, the man must be ready to throw it into 
fire if so required by the mind or dignity: “Agatur eius diligentissime cura, ita 
tamen ut, cum exiget ratio, cum dignitas, cum fides, mittendum in ignes sit.”67 
what results from this words is not contempt for the body, but only an indication 
that there are greater values than the body, about which he writes in another letter 
explaining that more important for the beauty of the body is beautiful spirit, as 
the soul is not marred by ugly body, whereas the soul’s beauty adorns the body: 
“scire possemus non deformitate corporis foedari animum, sed pulchritudine 
animi corpus ornari.”68
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Seneca exhorts to avoid dangers and even discomforts as far as possible, 
that is, to withdraw to a safe place to contemplate there how to chase away 
ones fears: “Nihilominus quantum possumus evitemus incommoda quoque, non 
tantum pericula, et in tutum nos reducamus, excogitantes subinde quibus possint 
timenda depelli.”69 These human fears are divided by the philosopher into three 
types. Namely, people are afraid of scarcity, diseases, and most of all, violence 
from the stronger, as it is accompanied by great uproar, turmoil and pump amid 
swords, fire, fetters, wild animals tearing human bodies to pieces (as opposed to 
natural afflictions, i.e. poverty and diseases, which silently creep in human lives 
without intimidating human senses, eyes or ears):
Quorum tria, nisi fallor, genera sunt: timetur inopia, timentur morbi, timentur quae per vim 
potentioris eveniunt. Ex his omnibus nihil nos magis concutit quam quod ex aliena potentia 
impendet; magno enim strepitu et tumultu venit. Naturalia mala quae rettuli, inopia atque 
morbus, silentio subeunt nec oculis nec auribus quicquam terroris incutiunt: ingens alterius 
mali pompa est; ferrum circa se et ignes habet et catenas et turbam ferarum quam in viscera 
immittat humana.70
Seneca gives other attributes of violence done to people by the stronger by 
evoking prisons, crosses, horse-shaped instruments of torture, hooks, stakes 
coming out of staked people’s mouths, speeding carts pulling the body in 
opposite directions, inflammable tunics:
Cogita hoc loco carcerem et cruces et eculeos et uncum et adactum per medium hominem 
qui per os emergeret stipitem et distracta in diversum actis curribus membra, illam tunicam 
alimentis ignium et illitam et textam, et quidquid aliud praeter haec commenta saevitia est.71
It must be remembered that those cruelties could be watched by the Romans, 
say, during shows organised by emperors.
According to Seneca, the greatest fear is aroused in the man not by poverty 
or diseases, but violence, and the reason is not its great diversity and horrific 
equipment, the mere sight of which appals people, as is often visible when an 
executioner unfolds his instruments of torture (although they would endure the 
torture itself). The same holds for the misfortunes afflicting human souls to 
conquer and subdue them. The most is achieved by those souls which demonstrate 
something:
Non est itaque mirum, si maximus huius rei timor est cuius et varietas magna et apparatus 
terribilis est. Nam quemadmodum plus agit tortor quo plura instrumenta doloris exposuit – 
69 ep. 14, 3.
70 ep. 14, 3–4.
71 ep. 14, 5.
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specie enim vincuntur qui patientiae restitissent – ita ex iis quae animos nostros subigunt et 
domant plus proficiunt quae habent quod ostendant.72
Seneca compares them to a great military which prevails with its mere 
appearance and armament: “haec ut magna bella aspectu paratuque vicerunt.”73
From the above remarks Seneca will draw a conclusion to avoid situations 
in which one can fall into other person’s disfavour: abstineamus offensis.74 The 
sage resembles a cautious helmsman who sticks to his course steering clear of 
notorious whirls: “longe ab illa regione verticibus infami cursum tenet.”75 This 
is what the sapiens does, making sure first of all that his danger-avoiding is not 
visible. He does so because part of the security consists in not seeking it too 
overtly, as avoiding something also means reproving or judging it: “Idem facit 
sapiens: nocituram potentiam vitat, hoc primum cavens, ne vitare videatur; 
pars enim securitatis et in hoc est, non ex professo eam petere, quia quae quis 
fugit damnat.”76 Apart from that, the philosopher advises to safeguard well 
against the populace in different ways. Hence, he recommends not to desire the 
same as others for there are arguments between rivals; secondly, not to possess 
too valuable things tempting a highwayman with a benefit, but wear as few 
clothes as possible that may fall prey to him (bloodshed for itself rarely takes 
place, and what in such an assault plays a major role is usually calculation, not 
hatred):
Circumspiciendum ergo nobis est quomodo a vulgo tuti esse possimus. Primum nihil idem 
concupiscamus: rixa est inter competitores. deinde nihil habeamus quod cum magno emo-
lumento insidiantis eripi possit; quam minimum sit in corpore tuo spoliorum. Nemo ad 
humanum sanguinem propter ipsum venit, aut admodum pauci; plures computant quam 
oderunt.77
Seneca goes on to draw attention to avoiding (in accordance with an ancient 
principle) hatred, jealousy and contempt, and explains that only wisdom advises 
how to achieve it; therefore one must deal with philosophy: “Tria deinde ex 
praecepto veteri praestanda sunt ut vitentur: odium, invidia, contemptus. 
Quomodo hoc fiat sapientia sola monstrabit (…). Ad philosophiam ergo 
confugiendum est.”78 Philosophy provides safety, shelter, becomes a peculiar 
place of refuge. As Seneca explains, it is quiet and occupied with itself, it cannot 
be despised since in contrast to other arts it enjoys respect of even the worst 
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people; never will wickedness gain such power, and never will such a conspiracy 
against the virtues be hatched so the name of philosophy could not remain 
venerable and holy:
haec quieta et sui negotii contemni non potest, cui ab omnibus artibus etiam apud pessimos 
honor est. Numquam in tantum convalescet nequitia, numquam sic contra virtutes coniurabi-
tur, ut non philosophiae nomen venerabile et sacrum maneat.79
At this point of his deliberations, the Roman philosopher comes to the matter 
of restraint in philosophy. He continues to recommend, both generally in life 
and now in philosophy, peace and moderation: “philosophia ipsa tranquille 
modesteque tractanda est.”80 He anticipates the allegation that after all Cato did 
not philosophise with restraint, since he even suppressed a civil war, stood amid 
troops of frenzied leaders, he fell into disfavour of Pompey and Caesar: “Quid 
ergo?’ inquis ‘videtur tibi M. Cato modeste philosophari, qui bellum civile 
sententia reprimit? qui furentium principum armis medius intervenit? qui aliis 
Pompeium offendentibus, aliis Caesarem, simul lacessit duos?,”81 and explains 
that both those and recent times have no given the philosophy its rightful place, 
therefore the sage should not deal with politics, and invites to the circle of 
those Stoics who keeping away from state affairs moved aside to (not defying 
established customs or drawing people’s attention to their unusual way of life) 
devote themselves to ennobling their lives and creating laws for the mankind 
while not offending those who have greater power.
Ultimas partes attigi Catonis; sed ne priores quidem anni fuerunt qui sapientem in illam rapi-
nam rei publicae admitterent. (…) Sed postea videbimus an sapienti opera rei publicae danda 
sit: interim ad hos te Stoicos voco qui a re publica exclusi secesserunt ad colendam vitam et 
humano generi iura condenda sine ulla potentioris offensa. Non conturbabit sapiens publicos 
mores nec populum in se vitae novitate convertet.82
Admittedly, such behaviour does not guarantee security, but increases it, for 
which he gives an example of ships some of which really perish at port, but it 
happens more frequently on the high seas (“Perit aliqua navis in portu: sed quid 
tu accidere in medio mari credis?”83). The same holds for people. Much greater 
dangers are waiting for those who deal and trouble themselves with many 
matters, for whom even rest is not safe; the guilty perish more often than the 
innocent; even a master happens to be struck by his work, but he stays proficient 
in is art:
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Quanto huic periculum paratius foret multa agenti molientique, cui ne otium quidem tutum 
est? Pereunt aliquando innocentes – quis negat? – nocentes tamen saepius. Ars ei constat qui 
per ornamenta percussus est.84
Among these remarks, there appears the following one:
“Quid ergo? utique erit tutus qui hoc propositum sequetur?” Promittere tibi hoc non magis 
possum quam in homine temperanti bonam valetudinem, et tamen facit temperantia bonam 
valetudinem.85
Temperantia appears in response to the question about the sage’s effective 
withdrawal from public affairs to ensure himself safe life. Finally, Seneca 
will answer that the sage cares for the purpose of all things, and not their final 
effect, because whereas the beginning of these matters lies within human power, 
however, their result depends on the fortune, although this fortuna does not 
have the final say on the man: “denique consilium rerum omnium sapiens, 
non exitum spectat; initia in potestate nostra sunt, de eventu fortuna iudicat, 
cui de me sententiam non do.”86 Nevertheless, before this answer is given, the 
philosopher evokes, among others, the above mentioned picture of the moderate 
man, to whom temperantia guarantees health to a certain degree. 
At this point, it can be reminded that Seneca, among the misfortunes 
afflicting man, mentioned scarcity (hunger and thirst) and diseases (like ulcers 
in the bowels and fever that devours them). In contrast to the violence from the 
stronger, these are not at all lesser, however, as opposed to violence, they remain 
in hiding, they show nothing, and thereby they do not instigate fear.
Illae pestes non minus graves sunt – famem dico et sitim et praecordiorum suppurationes et 
febrem viscera ipsa torrentem – sed latent, nihil habent quod intentent, quod praeferant: haec 
ut magna bella aspectu paratuque vicerunt.87
The philosopher writes no more about these afflictions, however, its worth 
invoking a fragment of another letter.
Namely, there appears a theme of the virtue of temperance in the context of 
disease when Seneca describes to Lucius a meeting with Claranus, a friend from 
school time (“Claranum condiscipulum meum vidi post multos annos”88). The 
man, although we was already old, and his body was tired, stayed young and 
strong in spirit, which for the philosopher proves that (although it seems that 
nature was unjust in this case by placing so great a spirit in so small a body) the 
84 ep. 14, 15.
85 ep. 14, 15.
86 ep. 14, 16.
87 ep. 14, 16.
88 ep. 66, 1.
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bravest and greatest spirit can be hidden behind any skin. Claranus overcame all 
obstacles, and by disdaining himself he disdained other things:
non, puto, exspectas ut adiciam senem, sed mehercules viridem animo ac vigentem et cum 
corpusculo suo colluctantem. Inique enim se natura gessit et talem animum male collocavit; 
aut fortasse voluit hoc ipsum nobis ostendere, posse ingenium fortissimum ac beatissimum 
sub qualibet cute latere. Vicit tamen omnia impedimenta et ad cetera contemnenda a contemp-
tu sui venit.89
For Seneca, he became an evidence of the fact that virtue needs no 
embellishment, as it is a huge adornment for itself, and sanctifies the body in 
which it settles. Therefore, Seneca even began to look differently at his friend 
from the old times, who now looks beautiful and good to him both in terms of 
the body and the soul: “Non enim ullo honestamento eget: ipsa magnum sui 
decus est et corpus suum consecrat. Aliter certe Claranum nostrum coepi intueri: 
formosus mihi videtur et tam rectus corpore quam est animo.”90 After all, virtue 
can grow in everyone (“virtutem omni loco nasci91”). Claranus demonstrates 
that body ugliness does not mar the soul, and the soul’s beauty adorns the body: 
“Claranus mihi videtur in exemplar editus, ut scire possemus non deformitate 
corporis foedari animum, sed pulchritudine animi corpus ornari.”92
The meeting with Claranus bore fruit with several remarks on disease-enduring 
in the letter. In the conversation with his old school friend, Seneca pondered on 
equality of all goods despite their three-fold condition (in accordance with the 
Stoic doctrine): “Hoc primo die quaesitum est, quomodo possint paria bona esse, 
si triplex eorum condicio est.”93 The first group of goods includes, among others, 
joy, peace, the good of the homeland (“Quaedam, ut nostris videtur, prima bona 
sunt, tamquam gaudium, pax, salus patriae”), and in the second group there 
appears temperantia in serious illness coupled with patient enduring of torments 
(“quaedam secunda, in materia infelici expressa, tamquam tormentorum patientia 
et in morbo gravi temperantia”94). The difference between these groups of goods 
consists in that the first ones are wished by people just like that, and the other 
ones by necessity: “Illa bona derecto optabimus nobis, haec, si necesse erit.”95 
One can add that Seneca observes a similar division in Epicurus who divides 
them into those he wishes (like body rest free from tribulation, and soul repose 
enjoying the view of its goods), and those he does not want to happen, yet he 
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endorses and approves them (like enduring bad health condition and the gravest 
sufferings):
dabo apud Epicurum tibi etiam nunc simillimam huic nostrae divisionem bonorum. Alia enim 
sunt apud illum quae malit contingere sibi, ut corporis quietem ab omni incommodo liberam et 
animi remissionem bonorum suorum contemplatione gaudentis; alia sunt quae, quamvis nolit 
accidere, nihilominus laudat et comprobat, tamquam illam quam paulo ante dicebam malae 
valetudinis et dolorum gravissimorum perpessionem.96
Following the Stoic doctrine, Seneca says that there is a third group of goods, 
like regular gait, calm and modest facial expression, or movements proper for a 
thoughtful man: “Sunt adhuc tertia, tamquam modestus incessus et compositus 
ac probus vultus et conveniens prudenti viro gestu.”97
Initially, Seneca follows this Stoic doctrine of division of the goods, and 
hesitates about whether these goods may be equal since one should be wished 
and others averted: “Quomodo ista inter se paria esse possunt, cum alia optanda 
sint, alia aversanda?.”98 This division, invoked by the philosopher, may raise 
concern about the value of temperance, after all one of the cardinal virtues.
In discussing the first goods,99 Seneca sees in them a state of mind, which 
is a virtue. “talis animus virtus est.”100 Virtue is equal in all its varieties, thus, it 
clearly results from the philosopher’s reasoning that virtue is also unchanging, 
its significance and value cannot even grow any more, as no attribute that 
manifests itself to the greatest extent is not going to increase over time, which 
can be testified to by the fact that there can be found nothing fairer that the fair, 
nothing truer than the true or (what’s particularly essential for the subject matter) 
more moderate than the moderate: “Itaque vis eius et magnitudo ultra non potest 
surgere, quando incrementum maximo non est: nihil invenies rectius recto, non 
magis quam verius vero, quam temperato temperatius.”101
Every virtue has its due measure and size: “Omnis in modo est virtus; modo 
certa mensura est,”102 and as virtue equal one another, so do virtue deeds and 
individuals who attained the virtues: “virtutes inter se pares sunt et opera virtutis 
et omnes homines quibus illae contigere.”103 Finally, Seneca decides that there are 
no differences among the manifestations of good, and therefore joy for instance 
(from the first group of goods, mentioned at the beginning of the letter), and 
steady enduring of torments (from the second group, which also includes similar 
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temperantia in serious illness) are equal, because in both of them the same spirit 
magnitude is visible: “Paria itaque sunt et gaudium et fortis atque obstinata 
tormentorum perpessio; in utroque enim eadem est animi magnitudo.”104
The philosopher anticipates a question whether the goods like joy and 
steadfast enduring of pain really differ in nothing, and answers that in nothing, 
as regards the virtues themselves, only they differ greatly with relation to what 
these virtue manifest themselves, as in the former there appears natural rest and 
relief, and in the latter – unnatural pain:
Quid ergo? nihil interest inter gaudium et dolorum inflexibilem patientiam?” Nihil, quantum 
ad ipsas virtutes: plurimum inter illa in quibus virtus utraque ostenditur; in altero enim natu-
ralis est animi remissio ac laxitas, in altero contra naturam dolor.105
It’s worth noting that later the expression contra naturam with reference 
to the goods is explained by the author of the letter as follows: the goods 
themselves are by no means contrary to nature, only sometimes what’s contrary 
to nature is that with regard to which the good originates, e.g. being injured, 
frying on fire, or being tormented by an illness are examples of things contrary 
to nature, however, behaviour of the spirit among those torments corresponds 
to nature. 
Quid ergo? aliquid contra naturam bonum est?’ Minime; sed id aliquando contra naturam est 
in quo bonum illud exsistit. Vulnerari enim et subiecto igne tabescere et adversa valetudine af-
fligi contra naturam est, sed inter ista servare animum infatigabilem secundum naturam est.106
In conclusion, the philosopher argues that the causes of the good are 
sometimes contrary to nature, but the good itself is never like that: “... breviter, 
materia boni aliquando contra naturam est bonum numquam.107
Coming back to the previous fragment of the letter, it can be noticed that 
in continuing his reasoning Seneca once again confirms that the content of 
experience does not change the virtue itself; the virtue remains equal, identical, 
as neither the painful and difficult content makes it worse, nor the joyous and 
cheerful content makes it better: “Virtutem materia non mutat: nec peiorem 
facit dura ac difficilis nec meliorem hilaris et laeta; necessest ergo par sit.”108 
Furthermore, the virtue is equally worthy of praise: whether placed in a sound 
body free from anxieties, or in a sick body stricken by suffering: “aeque laudabilis 
virtus est in corpore valido ac libero posita quam in morbido ac vincto.”109 what’s 
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interesting, further on Seneca will express his daring view that if some goods 
were to be greater than others, then those that seem unpleasant would be valued 
by him more than the pleasant and nice ones, and he would even call them more 
important, because it’s more meaningful to overcome difficulties than search for 
meaning in prosperity:
Permitte mihi, Lucili virorum optime, aliquid audacius dicere: si ulla bona maiora esse aliis 
possent, haec ego quae tristia videntur mollibus illis et delicatis praetulissem, haec maiora 
dixissem. Maius est enim difficilia perfringere quam laeta moderari.110
Further on in his deliberations, Seneca once again, in a still clearer expression, 
emphasises that three types of goods (about which he wrote at the beginning 
of his letter) are equal: “Quod si par omnium virtutum natura est, tria genera 
bonorum in aequo sunt.”111 Temperance is recommended both in suffering and 
joy, and is equally valuable in both these cases: “in aequo est moderate gaudere 
et moderate dolere.”112 After all, the health alike is of equal value (whether it is 
not weakened by anything, “inconcussa valetudo”, or it is restores using strong 
means and patience after serious and life-threatening diseases, “ex gravibus 
morbis et extrema minitantibus in tutum vi quadam et patientia educta”113), 
because the only objective of the goods is correspondence with nature, and this 
is the same in all the goods: “Bonorum unum propositum est consentire naturae; 
hoc [contingere] in omnibus par est.”114 Seneca gives an example of Epicurus 
who considered enduring serious illnesses to be a good while knowing well what 
suffering meant as there had been a day in his life (the greatest and the happiest 
day), when due to a bladder condition and stomach irritation he endured torments 
that could not be greater, and still, he called that day happy for himself:
… malae valetudinis et dolorum gravissimorum perpessionem, in qua Epicurus fuit illo sum-
mo ac fortunatissimo die suo. Ait enim se vesicae et exulcerati ventris tormenta tolerare ulte-
riorem doloris accessionem non recipientia, esse nihilominus sibi illum beatum diem.115
It may be recalled that among human afflictions, beside diseases and violence, 
Seneca also mentioned scarcity, and devoted some space to this problem. The 
110 ep. 66, 49. It’s worth noting that in another place Seneca highly appreciated such values 
as good health. He explains that in a frail body or having lost an eye he will certainly be well 
knowing that inside he has something stronger than the body, however, he would prefer to have a 
strong body; so, he will be enduring his bad health, but craving for the good one: “Et exilis corpore 
aut amisso oculo valebit, malet tamen sibi esse corporis robur, et hoc ita ut sciat esse aliud in se 
valentius; malam valetudinem tolerabit, bonam optabit” (VB 22, 2)
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issue of richness or its lack is quite often addressed in the writings of Seneca – 
philosopher and concurrently one of the wealthiest Romans at that time.
In the dialogue de vita beata, Seneca’s interesting utterance on wealth 
can be found, just as one on temperantia. Namely, possibly in defence of 
severe allegations of why he was so eager to deal with philosophy while being 
extremely rich (“Quare ille philosophiae studiosus est et tam dives vitam 
agit?”116), he strongly argues that there is no doubt that spiritual merits can 
be developed more in richness than poverty: “Quid autem dubii est quin haec 
maior materia sapienti viro sit animum explicandi suum in divitiis quam in 
paupertate.”117 paupertas only favours one type of virtue, that is, it helps not to 
break down or get overwhelmed: “in hac unum genus virtutis sit non inclinari 
nec deprimi.”118
It’s different in the case of scarcity, as richness gives ample room to develop 
any other virtues, including temperance, but also generosity, diligence, frugality 
or magnanimity: “in divitiis et temperantia et liberalitas et diligentia et dispositio 
et magnificentia campum habeat patentem.”119
wealth plays little role in acquiring virtues, including temperance, and can be 
taken away without major harm to the basic good (after all, riches are possessed 
by the sage, and not the other way around, like it happens with people who are 
not sages: “divitiae meae sunt, tu divitiarum es”120), however, it belongs to the 
goods which to some extent contribute to incessant joy (originating in virtue): 
“Quaedam enim, etiam si in summam rei parva sunt [ait] et subduci sine ruina 
principalis boni possunt, adiciunt tamen aliquid ad perpetuam laetitiam et ex 
virtute nascentem.”121
In the context of this cheering function of wealth in the sage’s life, it’s 
worth recalling Seneca’s utterance on pleasure. It is particularly relevant as 
it is pleasure, lust and delight that the definition of temperantia in Seneca’s 
writings is related to: cupiditas refrenare.122 So, it’s not surprising for the Greek 
philosopher to say that the greatest human joy does not involve the body, as the 
real, permanent and eternal goods are only those that are provided by the mind: 
“Non est summa felicitatis nostrae in carne ponenda: bona illa sunt vera quae 
ratio dat, solida ac sempiterna, quae cadere non possunt, ne decrescere quidem 
ac minui.”123 The other goods are called by Seneca presumed goods (opinione 
bona), and he only refers to them as comforts (commoda) and stately things 
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(producta)124 whose using also requires participation of the mind which helps 
keep them longer; in addition, it must be remembered that happiness itself 
requires temperance not to be a torment: “Quisquis illa sine ratione possedit 
non diu tenuit; ipsa enim se felicitas, nisi temperatur, premit. Si fugacissimis 
bonis credidit, cito deseritur, et, ut deseratur, affligitur.”125 Therefore, the 
philosopher draws attention to two aspects of possessing those opinione bona: 
they fade away extremely quickly, and the man keeps on caring for them so 
they do not leave, while protecting temperance and reasonable approach to 
those goods. 
The Roman philosopher argues that it is commonly known that the more 
stupid one is, the more delight they take, and that even wickedness flows with 
pleasures, and the soul itself provides many wicked delights, among them first of 
all wastefulness, too high opinion of oneself, pride lording it over others, blind 
and unreasonable love of one’s things, great joy for most trivial or even childish 
reasons, followed by (as a second group of delights as it were) garrulousness, 
mockery-enjoying aloofness, sloth, and laziness of sluggish spirit flowing with 
pleasures and dozing in itself:
Atqui quis ignorat plenissimos esse voluptatibus vestris stultissimos quosque et nequitiam 
abundare iucundis animumque ipsum genera voluptatis prava et multa suggerere? — in primis 
insolentiam et nimiam aestimationem sui tumoremque elatum super ceteros et amorem rerum 
suarum caecum et inprovidum et ex minimis ac puerilibus causis exultationem, iam dicacita-
tem ac superbiam contumeliis gaudentem, desidiam dissolutionemque segnis animi, deliciis 
fluentis, indormientis sibi.126
Having counted these examples of delights, the philosopher explains how 
virtue is related to them. So, virtue dispels them, and pulls the man’s ear: 
“Haec omnia virtus discutit et aurem pervellit.”127 It’s worth explaining that 
the ancients considered the ear as the source of memory, about which Pliny the 
Elder wrote: “est in aure ima memoriae locus.”128 Thus, puling one’s ears may 
mean reminding someone their duties, obligations, reprimand or warning.129 
Seneca goes on to explain that virtue evaluates any pleasure before admitting 
it, and never any delight (none of the above mentioned groups); even if virtue 
admits it, it does not hold it in high esteem or enjoy using it: “et voluptates 
aestimat antequam admittat nec quas probavit magni pendit aut utique enim 
124 Cf. ep. 74, 17. Term producta is a translation of Greek prohgmšna (compare Cicero, de 
finibus bonorum et malorum 3, 52: “productum esse ad dignitatem”).
125 ep. 74, 18.
126 VB 10, 2
127 VB 10, 3
128 Plin. Nat. 11, 103 [251].
129 Cf. Joachimowicz 1989, 698.
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admittit nec usu earum (…) laeta est.”130 Here, Seneca invokes temperance as 
a kind of contrast to all those delights. Temperantia is the reason for joy for 
the virtue: “... sed temperantia laeta est.”131 In an imaginary conversation with 
his opponent, Seneca says:
Temperantia autem, cum [voluptates] minuat, summi boni iniuria est. Tu voluptatem complec-
teris, ego compesco; tu voluptate frueris, ego utor; tu illam summum bonum putas, ego nec 
bonum; tu omnia voluptatis causa facis, ego nihil.132
So, the philosopher does not embrace delight, but restricts it, he does not 
enjoy it, but uses it, he neither recognises it as the highest good, but fails to 
recognise it as the good at all, and finally, he does nothing in its name.
Further on in his exposition, Seneca establishes: “Non voco autem sapientem 
supra quem quicquam est, necdum voluptas.”133 Hence, the philosopher may not 
depend on anything, an particularly delight. If he is overwhelmed by it, he will 
not stand up to hardships, dangers, poverty or so many other hazards that await 
everywhere, murmuring, to take human lives; neither will he bear the sight of 
death, sufferings, world bangs, a storm of the most severe enemies, since he has 
been defeated by delight, such a gentle opponent: 
Atqui ab hac occupatus quomodo resistet labori et periculo, egestati et tot humanam vitam 
circumstrepentibus minis? Quomodo conspectum mortis, quomodo dolores feret, quomodo 
mundi fragores et tantum acerrimorum hostium, a tam molli adversario victus?134
This will not be good for people overwhelmed by lust, as, although they 
live in delight, their happiness does not stem from the good: “Hos esse in 
voluptatibus dices, nec tamen illis bene erit, quia non bono gaudent.”135 Those 
who take advantage of any delights (“magnas percipient voluptates”) are called 
by Seneca as fools (stulti) and fickle (inaequales), as well as mad and insane 
with delirious smile (“hilarem insaniam insanire as per risum furere”), although 
he believes that they sometimes feel sorry (“sub intu paenitentiae positi”).136 
what they are really missing is both virtue and delight, as they lose the former, 
and lack the latter, because they are possessed by delight which torments them 
by its shortage, and on other occasions by its excess, which Seneca illustrates by 
sailors on the sand, and their struggling with a tempest:
130 VB 10, 3.
131 VB 10, 3.
132 VB 10, 3.
133 VB 11, 1.
134 VB 11, 1.
135 VB 11, 4.
136 Cf. VB 12, 1.
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At ei qui voluptati tradidere principia utroque caruere; virtutem enim amittunt, ceterum non 
ipsi voluptatem, sed ipsos voluptas habet, cuius aut inopia torquentur aut copia strangulantur, 
miseri si deseruntur ab illa, miseriores si obruuntur; sicut deprensi mari Syrtico modo in sicco 
relinquuntur, modo torrente unda fluctuantur.137
Undoubtedly, such people are not distinguished by temperantia. On the 
contrary, they are characterised by their intemperantia: “Evenit autem hoc nimia 
intemperantia et amore caeco rei.”138 In striving for bad things instead for good 
ones, they are working towards thir goal among hazards: “nam mala pro bonis 
petenti periculosum est adsequi.”139
Seneca customarily illustrates this thought using an example. Namely, lustful 
people resemble hunters of wild animals which sometimes still tear their hunters 
to pieces after being caught, because great libertines fall into great misfortunes, 
and sometimes they get caught by what they caught (and the more numerous 
and greater those things are, the more debased and slave to more delights the 
libertine is, whom the rable calls lucky):
Ut feras cum labore periculoque venamur et captarum quoque illarum sollicita possessio est 
– saepe enim laniant dominos – ita habent se magnae voluptates: in magnum malum evasere 
captaeque cepere; quae quo plures maioresque sunt, eo ille minor ac plurium servus est quem 
felicem vulgus appellat.140
The philosopher does not want to forsake his comparison of lustful man to 
the hunter (“Permanere libet in hac etiamnunc huius rei imagine”141), as he wants 
to draw attention to another thing. Namely, The hunter inspects the lair of a wild 
animal, and strains to catch it using a net and dogs (Seneca invokes a poetic 
fragment of Vergil’s Georgics142):
Quemadmodum qui bestiarum cubilia indagat et
laqueo captare feras
magno aestimat et
latos canibus circumdare saltus.143
Moreover, to be able to chase wild animals, he abandons many more 
important matters, and pushes aside his duties: “illarum vestigia premat, potiora 
137 VB 14, 1; the mentioned mare syrticum is two gulfs, Great Sirte and Minor Sirte, off the 
northern coast of Africa; syrtis (Greek sÚrtij) means a sirte, a sandbank near the coast; these two 
Africal sirtes were particularly famous – Cf. e.g. kruczkiewicz 1925, 856.
138 VB 14, 2.
139 VB 14, 2.
140 VB 14, 2.
141 VB 14, 3.
142 Cf. Verg. Georg. I 139–140: “tunc laqueis captare feras et fallere visco / inventum et magnos 
canibus circumdare saltus”; this fragment is quoted by Seneca in full, also in ep. 90, 11.
143 VB 14, 3.
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deserit multisque officiis renuntiat.”144 In Seneca’s opinion, such behaviour 
reveals the similarity between a man indulging himself to delight, who follows 
it putting everything else beneath it, and particularly he neglects freedom by 
using it to pay for stomach delights, whereas, in reality, he does not buy the 
delights, but sells himself to them: “qui sectatur voluptatem omnia postponit et 
primam libertatem neglegit ac pro ventre dependit, nec voluptates sibi emit sed 
se voluptatibus vendit.”145
The philosopher’s delights are demonstrated by Seneca as totally different 
from those mentioned above. The sage’s delights are quiet and moderate, 
almost languid, muffled, barely visible, because they do not come on request, 
and they are neither held in esteem (should they come all by themselves) nor 
are welcomed by those who already experience them, mixing them with other 
games and entertainments of life:
At contra sapientium remissae voluptates et modestae ac paene languidae sunt compressaeque 
et vix notabiles, ut quae neque accersitae veniant nec, quamvis per se accesserint, in honore 
sint neque ullo gaudio percipientium exceptae; miscent enim illas et interponunt vitae ut lu-
dum iocumque inter seria.146
what’s most important for the sage is virtue which guides him and carries a 
banner in front of him, as it were, and as regards delight, he is its master and the 
one who moderates it, therefore it can only entreat something with him, but it is 
surely not able to force him to do anything: “Prima virtus eat, haec ferat signa: 
habebimus nihilominus voluptatem, sed domini eius et temperatores erimus; 
aliquid nos exorabit, nihil coget.”147 Seneca uses the term temperator in this 
fragment. Undoubtedly, this term is associated with the virtue of temperantia, 
which is possessed by the sage, and this is particularly visible in his relation to 
voluptas, as it must be remembered that temperance is voluptatibus imperare or 
cupiditates refrenare.148
Virtus and voluptas are impossible to reconcile. Seneca explains that part 
of what’s noble should also be like that: “pars honesti non potest esse nisi 
honestum,”149 which implies that voluptas is not honesta. Another argument 
against combining (or merging150) virtue with delight is arguing that the highest 
good would not maintain its purity if it had in itself anything different than the 
better whole: “nec summum bonum habebit sinceritatem suam, si aliquid in se 
viderit dissimile meliori.”151
144 VB 14, 3.
145 VB 14, 3.
146 VB 12, 2.
147 VB 14, 1.
148 Cf. ep. 88, 29; 120, 11.
149 VB 15, 1.
150 Cf. VB 15, 1: “... in unum virtutem voluptatemque confundi.”
151 VB 15, 1.
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The philosopher cautions against merging virtue with delight by claiming that 
anyone who does that (even not placing them on equal footing) weaken with the 
mediocrity of one good the entire force of the other, and submits to the yoke of 
slavery this freedom which is invincible when the man has nothing more precious 
than this: “Qui vero virtutis voluptatisque societatem facit et ne ex aequo quidem, 
fragilitate alterius boni quidquid in altero vigoris est hebetat libertatemque illam, 
ita demum si nihil se pretiosius novit invictam, sub iugum mittit.”152 As a result 
of such improper actions, the man falls into greatest captivity, that is, the man 
becomes dependent on the fate, thereby living restlessly, suspiciously, fearfully, 
afraid of coincidences, subject to time; and it must be remembered that such a life 
is not a strong or stable foundation for virtue, but only an unstable little support: 
“Nam, quae maxima servitus est, incipit illi opus esse fortuna; sequitur vita anxia, 
suspiciosa, trepida, casum pavens, temporum suspensa momentis. Non das virtuti 
fundamentum grave, inmobile, sed iubes illam in loco volubili stare.”153
In general terms, these remarks concern all people: not only an average citizen, 
but also the ruler (which can be seen in the expression “patriae bonus tutor aut 
vindex”). Seneca claims that those who are guided by the tiniest impulses of 
delight and pain that convulse them constantly will not be obedient to god, and 
will not quietly accept what happens, but will complain about what the fate 
brings, and thus such people turned to delight will neither be good defenders or 
liberators of their homeland nor even guardians of their friends:
Quomodo hic potest deo parere et quidquid evenit bono animo excipere nec de fato queri 
casuum suorum benignus interpres, si ad voluptatum dolorumque punctiunculas concutitur? 
Sed ne patriae quidem bonus tutor aut vindex est nec amicorum propugnator, si ad voluptates 
vergit.154
The highest good must be in a safe place. Seneca explains that it must stand so 
high that no force could knock it off from there, and it couldn’t be reached by pain, 
hope, fear or any thing than could deplete its rights: “Illo ergo summum bonum 
escendat unde nulla vi detrahitur, quo neque dolori neque spei nec timori sit aditus 
nec ulli rei quae deterius summi boni ius faciat.”155 Surely, only virtue can reach 
such heights, because it will stand courageously, it will eagerly endure any events 
knowing that present difficulties are established by nature, and it will follow god:
escendere autem illo sola virtus potest. (…) illa fortiter stabit et quidquid evenerit feret non 
patiens tantum sed etiam volens, omnemque temporum difficultatem sciet legem esse naturae 
et (…) habebit illud in animo vetus praeceptum: deum sequere.156
152 VB 15, 3.
153 VB 15, 3–4.
154 VB 15, 4.
155 VB 15, 5.
156 VB 15, 5.
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Acceptance of divine order is a duty of all people who by virtue of the oath 
are supposed to endure what’s mortal not losing their peace of mind for things 
that are beyond human power: “Quidquid ex universi constitutione patiendum 
est, magno suscipiatur animo: ad hoc sacramentum adacti sumus, ferre mortalia 
nec perturbari iis quae vitare non est nostrae potestatis.”157 This exposition is 
concluded by Seneca briefly and specifically: “In regno nati sumus: deo parere 
libertas est.”158
In referring to the expression about kingdom, it’s worth reminding a 
fragment of one of the philosopher’s letters. Senecan writes in it that the man’s 
king is the spirit: “Rex noster est animus.”159 So, one has to care for the spirit, 
because it is the source of thoughts, words, attitude, facial expression, and the 
way one walks, and when the spirit is sane and full of power, then everything 
else (like, say, human speech) is also robust, strong and brave, and when the 
spirit has weakened, then everything falls into decline: “Ideo ille curetur: ab illo 
sensus, ab illo verba exeunt, ab illo nobis est habitus, vultus, incessus. Illo sano 
ac valente oratio quoque robusta, fortis, virilis est: si ille procubuit, et cetera 
ruinam sequuntur.”160 Bad things happen to a man whose spirit has acquiesced 
itself to lust, because then his abilities and deeds become idle, and everything he 
tries to do is indolent and weak: “Cum vero cessit voluptati, artes quoque eius 
actusque marcent et omnis ex languido fluidoque conatus est.”161 Promiscuous, 
lustful and spoiled spirit does not care for virtue or the body entrusted to it, to 
which he orders all that’s disgraceful and unsightly, as it ceases to be the king, 
and becomes an abominable and atrocious tyrant:
Animus noster modo rex est, modo tyrannus: rex cum honesta intuetur, salutem commissi sibi 
corporis curat et illi nihil imperat turpe, nihil sordidum; ubi vero inpotens, cupidus, delicatus 
est, transit in nomen detestabile ac dirum et fit tyrannus.162
Initially, he enjoys his unbridled passions, although similar to the way rabble 
does, filled with harmful patronage for free, catching what they cannot swallow 
any more: “Tunc illum excipiunt adfectus inpotentes et instant; qui initio quidem 
gaudet, ut solet populus largitione nocitura frustra plenus et quae non potest 
haurire contrectans.”163
However, over time this lust takes away strengths and brings diseases, 
and, as Seneca vividly explains, pleasures creep in the marrow and veins, and 
157 VB 15, 7.
158 VB 15, 7.
159 ep. 114, 23.
160 ep. 114, 22.
161 ep. 114, 23.
162 ep. 114, 24.
163 ep. 114, 24.
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delighted with the sight of pleasures which have made the man useless by being 
excessively desired, and he does not feel any delight any more. He can only 
watch the amusement of others as provider and witness to the lusts, which he has 
already taken away from him be bringing them earlier onto himself:
cum vero magis ac magis vires morbus exedit et in medullas nervosque descendere deliciae, 
conspectu eorum quibus se nimia aviditate inutilem reddidit laetus, pro suis voluptatibus ha-
bet alienarum spectaculum, sumministrator libidinum testisque, quarum usum sibi ingerendo 
abstulit.164
Such a man, although he flows with pleasures, experiences bitterness, as he 
misses what he will not be able to use because of his illness, that is drinking to 
excess and stuffing himself with delicacies, taking part in orgies with debauchees 
and women:
Nec illi tam gratum est abundare iucundis quam acerbum quod non omnem illum apparatum 
per gulam ventremque transmittit, quod non cum omni exoletorum feminarumque turba co-
nvolutatur, maeretque quod magna pars suae felicitatis exclusa corporis angustiis cessat.165
As a rich and influential man, Seneca must have seen such people quite often 
when participating or organising meetings at the table. He understands how 
pernitious such a behaviour is, and cautions Lucilius against it pointing out two 
matters.
One of them is the fact that licentious people are not moderate in their 
behaviour as they do not think of themselves as single persons: “immo quod 
nemo nostrum unum esse se cogitat?”166 The philosopher clarifies this problem 
again very vividly by writing that cooks bustling about at hearths prepare so 
much food that that one stomach is not able to eat it all up. The similar case is 
with old wines from different countries collected in cellars for centuries:
Aspice culinas nostras et concursantis inter tot ignes cocos: unum videri putas ventrem cui 
tanto tumultu comparatur cibus? Aspice veteraria nostra et plena multorum saeculorum vin-
demiis horrea: unum putas videri ventrem cui tot consulum regionumque vina cluduntur?167
Also, one stomach cannot eat what thousands of serfs working on the fields 
of Sicily and Africa sow and cultivate for him: “Aspice quot locis terra vertatur, 
quot millia colonorum arent, fodiant: unum videri putas ventrem cui et in Sicilia 
et in Africa seritur?”168 In this way, Seneca explains frenzy of the mighty who 
164 ep. 114, 25.
165 ep. 114, 25.
166 ep. 114, 26.
167 ep. 114, 26.
168 ep 114, 26.
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have indulged themselves with pleasures: each of them completely forgot about 
the limit of their possibilities as single person.
The philosopher draws Lucilius’ attention to yet another matter: “Numquid 
enim, mi Lucili, [non] in hoc furor est, quod nemo nostrum mortalem se 
cogitat, quod nemo inbecillum.”169 In these words he poses a problem of 
human limitation, specifically mortality and weakness. A little bit further on, 
he combines good health with temperance in desires, and calls on to remember 
not only that one is a single person, but also that the body has its limits. So, one 
must know that the body is not able to accommodate much, and not for long: 
“Sani erimus et modica concupiscemus si unusquisque se numeret, metiatur 
simul corpus, sciat quam nec multum capere nec diu possit.”170 Hence, 
Seneca calls for temperance, and what he considers as the most important 
factor helping to achieve the virtue of temperantia in everything is frequent 
meditation on how short and uncertain human life is: “Nihil tamen aeque tibi 
profuerit ad temperantiam omnium rerum quam frequens cogitatio brevis aevi 
et huius incerti: quidquid facies, respice ad mortem.”171 He recommends for 
the man to remember about death in any activities.
with these deliberations of Seneca on temperantia in the context of fragility 
of human life (given virtually on the negative side), one must not forget about 
the positive approach to this problem, i.e. that temperance accompanies other 
virtues in leading the man to heavens: “hac ‘itur ad astra’172 (…) hac secundum 
temperantiam.”173 Jupiter himself is not superior in anything to a perfect man. 
The god is only perfect for more time. However, the fact that the sage’s virtues 
manifest themselves in a shorter time does not make him feel inferior to a deity, 
because the god is not superior to the sage in happiness even for the sake of his 
advantage in age. Greatness of virtue does not depend on its lasting in time:
Iuppiter quo antecedit virum bonum? diutius bonus est: sapiens nihilo se minoris aestimat 
quod virtutes eius spatio breviore cluduntur. (…) deus non vincit sapientem felicitate, etiam si 
vincit aetate; non est virtus maior quae longior.174
Jupiter wants to share what he has with people; he has given to others what 
he had, and ensured using it to everyone: “Iuppiter omnia habet, sed nempe aliis 
tradidit habenda: (…) utendi omnibus causa est.”175 The gods do not abhor or 
envy people, but they act quite the opposite, as they allow people to be close to 
169 ep. 114, 26.
170 ep. 114, 27.
171 ep. 114, 27.
172 Cf. Verg. Aen. IX 641: “... sic itur ad astra.”
173 ep. 73, 15.
174 ep. 73, 13.
175 ep. 73, 14.
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them and give a hand to those who come to them: “Non sunt dii fastidiosi, non 
invidi: admittunt et ascendentibus manum porrigunt.”176
From this statement of Seneca one can also conclude that the gods help in 
acquiring the virtue of temperantia, in developing its seeds. A god comes by 
himself, or actually enters into people, otherwise no human mind would be 
good. In human bodies are dispersed divine seeds which need a good carer to 
be able to grow to become plants they originated from, otherwise, under bad 
care, they will be destroyed by barren soil that only yields rubbish instead of 
fruit.
deus ad homines venit, immo quod est propius, in homines venit: nulla sine deo mens bona 
est. Semina in corporibus humanis divina dispersa sunt, quae si bonus cultor excipit, similia 
origini prodeunt et paria iis ex quibus orta sunt surgunt: si malus, non aliter quam humus ste-
rilis ac palustris necat ac deinde creat purgamenta pro frugibus.177
In conclusion, Seneca calls temperantia as restraining desires, cupiditates 
refrenare. It is a power of ordering delights, it is supposed to hate and chase 
away ones, and subordinate other by bringing them to proper measures, never 
according to human whims, but human duty. The Roman philosopher recommends 
temperance not only with reference to one’s own lust, but also human relations, 
like, say, imposing penalty, as this virtue is strongly related to clementia. This 
Roman philosopher and politician paid special attention to temperance of the 
ruler: his temperantia is truest when it is the love of the human race as himself. 
To be temperate means for the ruler not to be guided by lust, imprudence, and 
not to follow bad models left by predecessors cruel to their citizens: temperantia 
of a clement ruler, respected by his subjects ensures sustainability and unity to 
the state.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
In Seneca’s writings, the author’s name is skipped, the titles are given in short form:
Ben. – de beneficiis
Cl. – de clementia
ep. – Ad Lucilium epistulae morales
ira – Ad Novatum de ira
Tr. – Ad serenum de tranquillitate animi
VB – Ad Gallionem de vita beata
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TeMpeRANTiA, стоицкая „золотая середина” по сенеке
р е з ю м е
сенека, будучи последователем и представителем философской школы младшей стои, 
склонялся к эклектике и ставил этику на первый план. его философские сочинения посвя-
щены вопросам практической морали. он стремился дать людям утешение посредством 
житейской мудрости. цель человека заключается в том, чтобы „жить в согласии с приро-
дой.” сенека учил как жить и поэтому много писал о добродетелях. Философ хотел, чтобы 
император и каждый человек обладал такими качествами, как: воздержанность, мужество, 
разумность, справедливость и чтобы знал, что добродетель „следует обуздать желания, по-
давить боязнь, разумно заботиться о предстоящих делах, раздать всё, что должно быть от-
дано.” сенека учил: „Воздержность умеряет наслажденья; одни она с ненавистью изгоняет, 
другие соразмеряет и сокращает до здорового предела, никогда не приближаясь к ним ради 
них самих. она знает, что лучшая мера для всего желанного – взять не сколько хочется, а 
сколько необходимо.”
